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LEE H. WHITLOCK,
Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Respondent in its brief for the first time claims that
the order signed, made and entered by Judge Abe
W. Turner on December 21, 1939, denying appel-
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lant 's motion, from which order this appeal is taken,
is not a final order and, therefore, not appealable and has
cited many cases which it claims support this contention.
We respectfully submit that none of the cases cited
in any manner, either directly or by inference, sustain
such contention. The test of the finality of a judgment
or order, as has been repeatedly stated by this Honorable
Court, is whether or not the particular action or proceeding taken has been finally terminated. If the judgment
or order finally terminates the proceeding, leaving nothing further to be done by the trial court or by the
parties, the order is final and appealable.
Honerine Min. & Mill Co., et al. vs. Tallerday Steel
Pipe & Tank Co., et al., 30 Utah 449, Page 451: "It is the
termination of the particular action which marks the
finality of the judgment.''
Winnovich vs. Emery, 33 Utah 345, Page 352: "The
test of finality for the purpose of an appeal, therefore, is
not necessarily whether the whole matter involved in
the action is concluded, but whether the particular proceeding or action is terminated by the judgment. If it is,
and, in order to proceed further with regard to the same
subject matter, a new action or proceeding must be commenced. Then, as a general rule, the judgment which
ends the particular action or proceeding is final for the
purpose of appeal, if an appeal is permissible at all."
The only statement in respondent's brief that there
was anything further to be done in the case at bar is that
appellant could have amended his motion to one praying
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. . _._

for an order vacating the judg1uent because of lack of
jurisdiction or because of defective service. If you
carry respondent's argument to its logical conclusion,
this would then mean that in the event appellant had
so an1ended his motion and the court had denied the
same and entered an order dismissing the motion, that
order would not be a final appealable order as the appellant might have still furt.her amended his motion to
ask for some further relief. Likewise, this argument
would mean that if a demurrer is sustained to a complaint and the plaintiff has elected to stand upon the
demurrer and a judgment of dismissal has been entered,
the judgment of dismissal would not be an appealable
order as respondent would claim that the plaintiff in that
action could have asked the court for permission to
amend his complaint in some respect. The argument of
respondent clearly disproves itself.
In all of the cases cited by respondent, there was
something further either to be done by the court in order
to finally determine the proceeding before it or the proceeding was left pending before the court with the right
of one party or the other to take some action to assure
the continuance of the proceeding to a hearing upon the
merits before the action or proceeding was finally terminated.
In the case of Shurtz vs. Thorley, et al, 90 Utah
381, quoted from at length by respondent, an action was
brought against two claimed obligors. The separate
demurrer of one of them was sustained; an order of
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dismissal as to him was made and entered and an appeal
taken by the plaintiff from that order, leaving the complaint as against the other defendant undisposed of in
the District Court. There, of course, the proceeding,
which was the action commenced by the plaintiff, was
not terminated. It remained before the District Court
undisposed of. It is also interesting to note that this
court in that case cites, with approval, in re Phillips
Estate, 86 Utah 358, 44 Pac. (2d) 699, wherein the dismissal of a petition to set aside probate proceedings
after discharge of administrator was held to be a final
judgment for purposes of appeal. Such a proceeding
is very similar to the proceeding at bar.
The cases cited by respondent involving rulings
upon motions to quash Summons prior to judgment are
not applicable to the case at bar. When the court sustains a motion to quash a summons and the plaintiff does
not choose to stand upon his summons and does not
have an order entered dismissing the action, which would
clearly be a final appealable order, he can have an alias
summons issue and bring the defendant before the court
and obtain a final adjudication of the action upon its
merits. A party making a motion after judgment obviously has no such choice. When the court denies a motion to quash summons, the defendant may permit the
action to go to final judgment and appeal from that final
judgment and assign as error the ruling upon the motion to quash the summons or he may appear in the action
and answer to the merits. Here again a party bringing
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a proceeding after judgn1ent has no such election. r:ehere
is nothing that either the court or either party can do
when the n10tion is after judgn1ent that would in any way
make the detennination of the court a more final and
complete determination of the proceedings brought by
appellant. To hold that the order of December 21, 1939
was not an appealable order would entirely prevent a review by this court of what is claimed by the appellant to
be an erroneous ruling by the District Court.
The quotation by respondent from the case of Ryan
t·s. Davenport, 3. S. Dak. 53, 58 N. W. 558, appearing
on Page 15 of its brief, recognizes the difference between
proceedings taken attacking the jurisdiction of the court
before or after judgment. The court states: "The effect
of this order is not to determine the action and prevent
a judgment; nor is it in a special proceeding, nor upon
a summary application in an action after judgment;''
Appellant respectfully submits that the order appealed from finally determined the proceeding taken
by appellant and was a final appealable order and the
appeal, therefore, must be heard by this court.

In REPLY to the remainder of respondent's brief,
appellant respectfully submits the following:
Respondent states under heading "B" of its brief,
m substance, that the form of appellant's motion precluded the respondent from defending the judgment and
that it was precluded from establishing or attempting to
establish facts that would sustain the judgment even
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though there was a void or defective service of summons. We submit that appellant's motion was directed
to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendant and, of course, any evidence that the respondent might have that would establish that, in fact,
the court did have jurisdiction would have been admissible upon the hearing of the motion. Respondent intimates that it might have had proof of the fact that appellant entered an appearance in the action or that laches
or inexcusable neglect on the part of appellant might
have justified the court in refusing to set the judgment
aside. The entire record and all of the evidence taken
upon the hearing is before the court in this matter.
There is nothing in the record that would in any way
support a contention that an appearance was made by
appellant; in fact, the judgment itself shows upon its
face that it was based upon the claimed service of process, the failure of the defendant, Whitlock, to answer
the complaint and the elapsing of the time for answering
and the entry of a default for such failure to appear and
answer (Abs. 7). There can be no question of laches or
neglect on the part of the appellant as the motion was
brought within the time that the court retained jurisdiction over the proceeding and, further, there can be no
question of laches or neglect where the court has had
no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and the
judgment rendered is void as distinguished from merely
voidable. The judgment being void due to the lack of
any jurisdiction over the defendant, Whitlock, the judg-
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ment wa~ a nullity and had no force 01: effect whahwen:r as shown by the eases set forth in appellant's brief
and hereinafter set forth.
Under Subdivision D of respondent's brief, respondent urges and cites cases which it claims support its
position that the proceeding brought by appellant was
not a direct attack against the judgment. We feel that
appellant has covered this matter thoroughly in his brief
and cited convincing authorities proving the attack to
be direct as distinguished from collateral. The cases cited
by respondent under said Subdivision D of its brief are
cases of clear collateral attack and are distinguished
from the case at bar on the facts and in no instance are
cases where as here there was an absolute lack of jurisdiction over either the subject matter or the person of
the defendant.
In reply to Subdivision E of respondent's brief to
the effect that the motion brought. by appellant was not
an allowable motion whether considered a collateral or
direct attack and contending that the courts have uniformly held such to be the case and in further reply to
Paragraphs B, C and D, appellant submits the following:
The cases of Gregg vs. Seawell, 85 Okla. 88, 204 Pac.
908, decided in 1922, Dannenburg vs. Powers, decided in
1938, 182 Okla. 404, 77 Pac. 1142, and Balrhcin vs. Burt,
54 Neb. 287, 74 N. W. 594, are all cases distinguisable
from the case at bar. They are all cases where the judgment attacked was not void, but was merely voidable.
In OrP.rJ.rJ 1;s. Seawell, a summons was served upon the
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defendant, the summons having been served by an attorney in the case. The only question involved was whether
or not the attorney under the statutes of Oklahoma had
authority to serve the summons. The defendant clearly
had had notice of the proceeding and the judgment was
clearly voidable as distinguished from void for lack of
jurisdiction over the defendant. The case was also ruled
upon a statute of Oklahoma which required the defendant in the event of a voidable judgment to proceed in
accordance with the requirements of that statute which
required a showing of a meritorious defense somewhat
similar to the requirement of our Section 104-14-4, which
is applicable when a party wishes to be relieved from
a mistake or excusable neglect regardless of whether the
judgment is valid or not.
In the case of Dannenburg vs. Powers, there had
also been a service of summons that at the most was
merely voidable and not void. A further element involved in that case was that the motion was not made
for more than ten days after the date of the judgment,
which had been entered by a Justice's Court, and the
court of Oklahoma held that the jurisdiction of the
Justice's Court was limited by statute, it not being a
court of general jurisdiction, and that the court had no
jurisdiction of any kind over its judgment after ten
days after the entry of the same. Further in that case
the court indicated that if the motion had been made
within the time that the court retained jurisdiction, the
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motion might have been treated as a motion to vacate
the judgn1ent, the court stating:
''Such motion cannot be treated as a motion
to vacate because it was filed after the ten days
allowed and, in addition, does not meet the oth~r
statutory requirements.''
The particular defects in the service in the case of
Baldwin vs. Burt do not appear from the decision; however, the judgment was attacked over six years after
its entry while under the Nebraska statutes the court lost
jurisdiction over the cause upon adjournment of the'term
in which it was entered. In the concurring opinion of
Chief Justice Regan, the foundation of the decision 'is
set forth as being that the defendant could only obtain
relief as provided by the Code of Civil Procedure of
Nebraska and that in order to vacate or attack the judgment, had to show a prima facie defense to the action.
This would seem to indicate that the judgment being attacked at the most must have been only voidable, not
void, for the cases are unanimous in holding that where
the judgment is void, there is no necessity to submit to
the jurisdiction of the court or to tender a defense to
the action as a condition to the voidance of the judgment.
There are two separate opinions in the case. One jus~
tice concurred in the result reached in the case; one
justice expressed no opinion, and one justice was not
sitting. It, therefore, is difficult to determine the exart
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holding of the court so far as its technical ruling upon
the form of the motion made is concerned.
The case of Producer's Naval Stores Co. vs. Brewton, 90 S. E. 735, (Ga.), most certainly would not be
authority in this jurisdiction as it is certainly not the
practice in this jurisdiction to traverse the return of a
sheriff or his deputy and the sheriff and deputy are
certainly not necessary parties to the proceedings.
The only objection raised by the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma in the Gregg vs. Seawell and Dannenburg vs.
Powers cases to the form of the motions brought therein
was that the motions were directed to the summons and
return thereof and not to the judgment itself and that
they were, therefore, collateral and not direct attacks
upon the judgment. We submit, first, that when you
attack the very jurisdiction of the court to render a
judgment, you most certainly are attacking that judgment as the judgment cannot stand without the presence
of jurisdiction, and further, this court in the case of
Intermill vs. Nash, 94 Utah 271, has held that any proceeding brought in the same proceeding in which the
judgment is entered is a direct attack and, therefore,
has held contrary to the Oklahoma Supreme Court upon
this point; secondly, we contend that the two Oklahoma
cases referred to do not state the law of the State of
Oklahoma with respect to judgments void for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant as distinguished from judgments merely voidable because of
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, error in the granting of the sa1ne or in the process upon
which they are based. In support of this contention, we
cite the case of Oklahoma Stock Yards Nat. Bk. vs.
Pierce, decided Nov. 24, 1925, rehearing denied Jan.
19, 1926, subsequent to the Gregg vs. Seawell case, reported i~ 243 Pac. 144. In the Oklahoma Stock Yards
case, an action was brought by the plaintiff to recover
a bank deposit from the defendant bank. The bank defended on the ground that the deposit had been taken by
virtue of a garnishment issued in aid of execution upon
a judgment against the plaintiff held by a third party.
The plaintiff filed a reply denying the allegations of
the answer and averring that she had never been served
with summons and had no knowledge of the action and
that the return of the constable though regular on its
face was false, the facts, therefore, being very similar
to the facts in the case now at bar. This attack made by
plaintiff upon the judgment introduced by the defendant under all of the authorities would be considered a
collateral attack upon the judgment as it was being
attacked in another proceeding and it was regular upon
its face. The court, however, held that when a judgment
is void for lack of jurisdiction over either the subject
matter or the person, the judgment can be attacked, directly or collaterally, and in any proceeding wherein the
validity of the judgment is claimed. The court at Page
144 states:
''If the return of this officer may be attacked
at all, it may be done by the oral testimony of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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defendant in error, and; if not, the return must be
held immune from attack. This court, however, in
Ray vs. Harrison, 32 Okla. 17, 121 P. 633, Ann.
Cas. 1914 A, 413, held:
'' 'When an officer makes a false return of
personal service on which a judgment is rendered,
when in fact there has been no service at all,
such return is not conclusive evidence against the .
fact.'
''In the body of the opinion, the court uses
this language :
'' 'While such a return is prima facie evidence of its truthfulness, and while it requires
clear and convincing proof to set it aside, it is
the duty of the court when evidence meets this
test, to act upon it, and not permit an established
falsehood to stand as true.'
''A judgment procured without the service
of process is a fraud, not only on the party against
whom the judgment is rendered, but on the court
as well, and it is always, as between the parties
thereto, subject to attack either collateral or direct, regardless of the name the remedy employed
may bear.
* * * *
"We are constrained to say that the name
of the procedure by which the judgment is attacked for fraud is not material. It may be
attacked by bill in equity. It may be attacked
by petition under Section 812, C. 0. S. 1921, or it
may be attacked in any proceeding where such
judgment is relied on as the basis of an action or
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as a defense, and to sustain the attaek evidence
dehors the record is competent.''
In running down the Oklahoma Stock Yards case
through the Shepard Citator, we find the case has only
been cited in two subsequent cases, one being Hall vs.
Jensen, 249 Pac. 310 (Okla.), in which the Oklahoma
Supreme Court distinguishes the case of void service
and irregular service and holds the doctrine not applicable. Page 311:
''Defendants, in their brief and argument,
assume that the defect in the service of the summons was jurisdictional and consisted in a false
return of the sheriff as to the services made on
the defendants, and they cite many authorities
to support the contention that they had the right
to show this defect by motion and evidence as to
the true facts in the case, but this court can not
consider assumptions for facts. There is no
record showing the facts assumed and stated by
defendants in their brief, and, therefore, nothing
to apply the law so cited and quoted by then1.
If there was no service of the sun1mons on the
defendants, the judgment rendered against them
is void, and they can raise this question of jurisdiction at any time by proper application ( Oklahoma Stock Yards Nat. Bank v. Pierce, 144 Okl.
25, 243 P. 144), unless they have waived it by
general appearance.''
The other case in which it is cited is the case of
Heiny vs. Sommers, 268 Pac. 287, in which case the
case was followed and held applicable where the sumSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mons had been served at a place other than at the usual
residence of the defendant.
The only explanation for the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in the Stock Yards case for not citing or referring to Gregg vs. Seawell, decided at an earlier date by
the same Court, and for the Oklahoma Supreme Court
in the Dannenburg vs. Powers case failing to refer to
the Oklahoma Stock Yards case, would be that the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered the cases clearly distinguishable upon the facts. In the one case, at the
most, the judgment was voidable only by reason of some
claim defect in the service of the summons, aJld, in the
other case, the judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
The Shepard Citator shows the case of Gregg vs.
Seawell cited five times: (1) in Intermill vs. Nash, our
Supreme Court case; (2) in Dannenburg vs. Powers;
(3) in Pappe vs. Law, 35 Pac. (2d) 941; ( 4) Protest of
Gulf Pipe Line Co., 32 Pac. (2d) 42; (5) In re Protest of
St. Louis- San Francisco Ry Co., 11 Pac. (2d) 189. In
each of the last three cases, the case of Gregg vs. Seawell is cited for authority for the well recognized rule of
law that where the court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties, errors and irregularities in the
proceedings by which the judgment was obtained will
not render the judgment void until vacated or set aside
in proper proceedings upon direct attack and that the
only question that can be raised upon a collateral attack
upon the judgment is as to whether or not the court
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did, in fact, haYe jurisdiction over the subject matter
and of the parties, and not whether the jurisdiction when
existent, was properly exercised.
In the case of Condit vs. Condit, 168 Pac. 456, decided in 1916, the Oklahmna Supreme Court in the
second syllabus, which is by the court, states:
''A judgment rendered without jurisdiction
of the person is no judgment at all; it is a mere
nullity. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication, nor is it entitled
to the respect accorded to one. It can neither
affect, impair, nor create rights. As to the person
against whom it professes to be rendered, it binds
him in no degree whatever. As to the person in
whose favor it professes to be, it places him in
no better position than he occupied before, and
gives him no new right. As to third persons, it
can neither be a source of title, nor an impediment
in the way of enforcing claims. It is not necessary
to take any steps to have it reversed, vacated or
set aside, and whenever it is brought up against
the party he may assail its pretensions and show
its worthlessness. It is supported by no presumptions, and may be impeached in any action, direct
or collateral. It is a judgment which is entirely
void, and may be shown to be void in a collateral
as well as a direct proceeding, by extrinsic evidence as well as by the record itself." (Italics
ours.)
This syllabus is taken almost verbatim, if not entirely so, from Black on Judgments, V olun1e 1, Paragraph 170.
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These cases clearly set forth the general rule of
law applicable where the judgment is void as distinguished from voidable and definitely hold that the attack can be made upon such a judgment in any manner
at any time as the judgment is not a judgment at all.
It is a mere nullity and has no protection by inference
or presumption.

Black on Judgments, Volume 1, Paragraph 220: "A
personal judgment rendered against a defendant without
notice to him, or an appearance by him, is without jurisdiction and is utterly and entirely void. (Citing numerous cases.).''
Stevens vs. Breen, decided January 15, 1940 by the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 258 App.
Div. 423, 16 N. Y. Sup. (2d) 909. This was a suit to
forclose a mortgage. The defendant offered in evidence
a decree in a partition action. Plaintiff introduced evidence to show that the summons had not been served
upon one of the defendants in that action. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff could not collaterally attack
the partition judgment in the foreclosure suit. The court
on Page 913 of the New York Supplement report of the
case held:
''In this defendant was mistaken. The rule
is that the 'want of jurisdiction to render the
particular judgment may always be asserted and
raised, directly or collaterally, either from an inspection of the record itself, when offered in behalf of the party claiming under it, or upon
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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extraneous proof, which is always ad1nissible for
that purpose.' (Citing eases.)''
See also Conunonzrealth, ex rel Howard vs. Howard,
10 Atl. (2d) 779; Covington Trust Co. of Covington vs.
Owens, 129 S. W. (2d) 186:
'' 'Jurisdiction' of a court, so as to render its
judgment immune from collateral attack after it
becomes final is easy to comprehend, but difficult
to state. It consists of two primary elements, (1)
jurisdiction of the subject matter, and (2) jurisdiction of the person complaining of the judgment.''

Ex Parte Cohen, (Calif.), 290 Pac. 512, sets forth the
same rule in the State of California. Davis vs. Davis,
197 Pac. 241, sets forth the rule in Colorado, the court
stating:
'' To recognize the decree (foreign divorce
decree) to the extent required to affirm the judgment in this case, however, would give it greater
force than we give our own, since in this state
we permit collateral attack on a judgment rendered without sufficient service.''

France vs. Freeze, et al, Washington Supreme Court,
decided May 11, 1940, 102 Pac. (2d) 687, Page 690:
"It matters not what the general powers and
jurisdiction of a court may be. If it act without
authority in a particular case, its orders and
judgments are mere nullities, protecting no one
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acting under them and constituting no hindrance
to the prosecution of any right. A judgment which
is absolutely void is entitled to no authority or
respect and may be impeached in collateral proceedings by anyone whose rights or interests it
conflicts. If the judgment is rendered by a court
without jurisdiction, either of the persons or of
the subject matter, such judgment may be subjected to collateral attack.''

Commonwealth of Kentucky for the use and benefit
of Kern vs. Maryland Casualty Co. of Baltimore, Maryland, decided June 5, 1940, C.C.A., 6th Circuit, 112 Fed.
(2d) 352:
"Appellant's contention that the judgment of
the state court is immune from collateral attack
is without merit. Such immunity cannot exist
unless the court awarding the judgment has
jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter
and the lack of either may be plead against the
judgment when sought to be enforced or when
benefit is chiimed under it.
''Judicial proceedings in personam against
one not served with legal process and not being
within the jurisdiction, neither appearing in person nor by attorney, are null and void. Webster
vs. Reid, 52 U. S. 437, 459, 11 How. 437, 439, 13
L. Ed. 671; Combs vs. Combs, 249 Ky. 155, 60 S.
W. (2d) 368, 89 A.L.R. 1095. When a judgment
by default is impugned, whatever may affect its
competency or regularity is open to inquiry in a
collateral proceeding.''
This Honorable Court in Intermill vs. Nash recog-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
nizes this same distinction between voidable judgments
and judg1nents void by reason of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter or the persons. The Honorable
Justice Larsen on Page 278 of the report states:
''A judgment once entered by a court of
competent jurisdiction lwving the res and the
parties duly brought before it as provided by
laze, imports verity, proves itself and is invulnerable to attacks by any indirect assaults."
(Italics ours.)
And on Page 282 :
''A judgment that is voidable cannot be attacked collaterally.''
And in the concurring opinion of Judge Wolfe at Page

286:
"But so jealous is the law of its judgment
recorded as such, that only such type of direct
attack can be made when it is claimed the judgment is void, not when it is only voidable, and
only can evidence be introduced of its voidness
when the pleadings set up wherein it is void."
Both in the opinion of Justice Larsen and in the
concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe, it is apparent that
the reason this Honorable Court refused to permit the
attack on the judgment in the Intermill case then before
it was due to the fact that the pleadings in the cause
did not sufficiently or at all set forth the defects claimed
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to have been present in the service of the summons, nor
was the entire record of that case before the Supreme
Court as it is in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully submits that
the proceedings taken by appellant and the ruling of the
court thereon are reviewable by this court; that the
proceedings taken were sufficient in all respects; that
the record and evidence conclusively establishes that the
court had no jurisdiction to render judgment against
appellant, and that the court, therefore, erred in denying
appellant's motion and in refusing to grant plaintiff any
relief from said void judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
MOYLE & MOYLE,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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